Book and WTO Dispute Data

Delivering on Promises

The Domestic Politics of Compliance in International Courts

A timely investigation into the conditions that make international agreements—and the institutions that enforce them—vulnerable.

When do international institutions effectively promote economic cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict? Although the international system lacks any central governing authority, states have created rules, particularly around international economic relations, and empowered international tribunals to enforce those rules. Just how successful are these institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren J. Peritz demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver results—but they are only effective under certain conditions. 

As Peritz shows, states are less likely to comply with international rules and international court decisions when domestic industries have the political ability to obstruct compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates the argument with an extensive empirical analysis that traces the domestic politics of compliance with the decisions of two international economic courts: the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism and the Court of Justice of the European Union. At a time when international agreements are under attack, this book sheds light on the complex relationship between domestic politics and international economic cooperation, offering detailed evidence that international economic courts are effective at promoting interstate cooperation.

Database on Compliance in World Trade Organization Disputes 

​The Database on Compliance in World Trade Organization Disputes provides detailed information on disputes in which the respondent government was found to be in breach of its WTO obligations. It contains information on whether the respondent complied with the panel and/or appellate body ruling, when it complied, and how it complied including the specific policies adopted or revoked through an administrative or legislative process. Where possible, the database also includes information on the bilateral settlements reached by the complainant and respondent governments and the domestic conflict within the respondent over the resolution of the WTO dispute. All coding choices are accompanied by a detailed case summary and supporting documents including government records, press releases, industry publications, etc. The data are current through 2016 and cover disputes up to DS412. The data will be updated periodically.

This research was made possible with financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-1421326, Leslie Johns PI / Lauren Peritz co-PI) and the Princeton University Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance. Thanks to excellent research assistants and the colleagues who provided guidance. 

Cite as: Peritz, Lauren. 2018. Database on Compliance in WTO Disputes. U.C. Davis.

Summary Dataset 


​Detailed Description of the Disputes